Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2020

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Substantive Equality,
Systemic Discrimination and Pay Equity at the Supreme Court of
Canada
Fay Faraday
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, ffaraday@osgoode.yorku.ca

Source Publication:
Forthcoming in (2020), Supreme Court Law Review, 2nd Series, Vol. 94

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Faraday, Fay, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Substantive Equality, Systemic Discrimination and Pay
Equity at the Supreme Court of Canada" (2020). Articles & Book Chapters. 2767.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works/2767

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital
Commons.

1
Forthcoming in (2020), Supreme Court Law Review, 2nd Series, Vol. 94

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?
Substantive Equality, Systemic Discrimination and Pay Equity at the Supreme
Court of Canada
by Fay Faraday*

ABSTRACT
In 2018, thirty one years after the equality rights guarantee in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms took effect, women won their first Supreme Court of Canada
appeal based on sex discrimination under section 15 of the Charter. Quebec (Attorney
General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé des services
sociaux struck down provisions of Quebec’s Pay Equity Act that denied women
remedies for sex discrimination in pay that was identified through pay equity audits.
Since 1987, the SCC has recognized that systemic discrimination infuses the systems,
institutions and relationships of power through which our society is organized. Yet, only
rarely do truly systemic cases of discrimination come before the Court and when they
do the Court has struggled to apply an appropriately systemic analysis. Alliance marks a
meaningful breakthrough. This paper examines how Alliance and its companion case,
Centrale des syndicats du Québec v Quebec (Attorney General), represent a strong
step forward in protecting against systemic discrimination. It analyzes jurisprudential
advances on substantive equality, the role of section 15(2) of the Charter, and bringing
a gender lens to the section 1 analysis. Examining the dissenting reasons, the paper
also analyzes how the two cases simultaneously highlight the unresolved fractures at
the foundation of equality rights jurisprudence that threaten its stability going forward.
Finally it reviews a federal legislative initiative and a provincial litigation strategy – both
on pay equity – that followed in the immediate aftermath of Alliance and CSQ to
highlight the fragility of section 15’s protection in the face of political resistance to
substantive equality. It asks whether, in a period of intensifying political polarization,
governments have stopped engaging in the “Charter dialogue” when it comes to
equality rights.
*

Fay Faraday is an Assistant Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. As a constitutional and human rights litigator,
she has represented clients in numerous Charter cases before the Supreme Court of Canada. Along with co-counsel
Janet Borowy, she represented the intervener coalition of the Ontario Equal Pay Coalition, New Brunswick Pay
Equity Coalition and the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) before the SCC in Quebec (Attorney
General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé des services sociaux, [2018] SJC No. 17,
2018 SCC 17 and Centrale des syndicats du Québec v Quebec (Attorney General), [2018] SCJ No. 18, 2018 SCC 18.
She represented the intervener Ontario Equal Pay Coalition in Ontario Nurses’ Association v Participating Nursing
Homes, 2019 ONSC 2168. The author thanks Janet Borowy for decades of collaboration and Barbara Brown for her
research assistance.
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I - INTRODUCTION
In 2018, thirty one years after the equality rights guarantee in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms took effect, women won their first Supreme Court of
Canada appeal based on sex discrimination under section 15 of the Charter. This
historical “first” was delivered in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel
professionnel et technique de la santé des services sociaux.1 The Court vindicated
women’s longstanding entitlement to non-discriminatory pay at work by striking down
provisions of Quebec’s Pay Equity Act (PEA) which allowed identified sex discrimination
in pay to go unrectified. The SCC had ruled previously on five section 15 appeals
alleging sex discrimination against women. All five claims failed. In only one did the
Court even find a section 15 violation before dismissing it as justifiable under section 1
1

[2018] SJC No. 17, 2018 SCC 17 (“Alliance”)
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of the Charter.2 Until 2018, the only successful section 15 sex discrimination cases at
the SCC had been brought by men.3 Alliance thus marks a watershed. An unsuccessful
companion pay equity appeal, Centrale des syndicats du Québec v Quebec (Attorney
General),4 was released the same day. Together the rulings plant seeds from which a
more rigorous substantive equality analysis could grow to confront systemic
discrimination. But celebration should remain tempered because the two cases
simultaneously blaze as warning signs of the unrelentingly unresolved fractures that lie
at the foundation of section 15 jurisprudence.
Three decades after its first Charter equality ruling, Andrews v. Law Society of
British Columbia,5 the SCC continues to wrestle with the most basic equality concepts:
What is the difference between formal equality and substantive equality? What is
systemic discrimination? What is the role of section 15(2)? Can violations of women’s
sex equality rights be justified in a free and democratic society under section 1 without
violating the section 28 commitment that all rights and freedoms in the Charter are
guaranteed equally to men and women?
Since Andrews,6 the Court has made at least seven foundational renovations to
the section 15 legal test and sustained a four-year period from 1995 to 1999 during

2

Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE, [2004] SCJ No. 61, 2004 SCC 66 found provincial restrictions on pay
equity violated s. 15 but ruled the violation justifiable in the existing financial circumstances. Sex discrimination
cases brought by women that were dismissed at the s. 15 stage were: Symes v. Canada, [1993] SJC No 161, [1993]
4 SCR 695; Native Women's Association of Canada v. Canada, [1994] SCJ No. 93, [1994] 3 SCR 627; Thibaudeau v.
Canada, [1995] SCJ No. 42, [1995] 2 SCR 627; Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining
Association v. British Columbia, [2007] SCJ No. 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391 succeeded on the union’s s. 2(d) Charter
challenge but the s. 15 claim was dismissed in just nine sentences (para. 164-167). Other equality rights cases have
succeeded under s. 15 in ways that advance equality for women; however these successful cases before Alliance
were argued as discrimination based on grounds other than sex, including disability, marital status, and civil status.
3
Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] SCJ No. 26, [1997] 1 SCR 358; Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney
General), [2003] SJC No. 32, [2003] 1 SCR 835.
4
[2018] SCJ No. 18, 2018 SCC 18 (“CSQ”).
5
[1989] SCJ No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143
6
This recitation of jurisprudential about-faces is updated from my book chapter: Fay Faraday, “Working Towards
Equality” in Unions Matter: Advancing Democracy, Economic Equality and Social Justice, Matthew Berens ed.
(Toronto: Between the Lines, 2014) at 165. See also Jennifer Koshan and Jonette Watson Hamilton, “The Continual
Reinvention of Section 15 of the Charter” (2013) 64 UNBLJ 19.
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which there was no majority position whatsoever on the legal test.7 That interregnum
was followed by nineteen years during which three core equality concepts were adopted
by a unanimous or majority court, only to be explicitly rejected in very short order.8
These reversals were then situated within a new characterization of the relationship
between sections 15(1) and 15(2) of the Charter, only to have the Court restore the
original relationship a decade later.9 With every section 15 case, the Court states the
legal test for equality rights with a slightly different nuance, leaving litigators and
scholars alike struggling to parse the significance, if any, of minute variations in
wording. Despite strong analysis in the 2018 majority judgments, however, the
jurisprudential restlessness threatens to continue as both appeals were decided by
narrow margins10 in which the majority and dissent again applied mutually incompatible
understandings of the four basic equality concepts identified above.
This perpetual instability makes equality litigation extremely unpredictable. It also
invites litigants to repeatedly contest section 15’s core principles. The meaning of
equality is thus always up for debate which undermines social discourse about and
commitment to equality as a fundamental right. Two government-led legal processes in
the immediate wake of Alliance and CSQ bear witness to this. Just five months after
Alliance, a federal pay equity law was introduced11 which included provisions negating
7

In the Court’s 1995 equality rights trilogy, the nine judges between them generated three distinct legal tests, one
with a fourth variation. No test secured majority support: Egan v. Canada, [1995], SCJ No. 43, [1995] 2 SCR 513;
Miron v. Trudel, [1995] SCJ No. 44, [1995] 2 SCR 418; Thibaudeau v. Canada, supra note 2. This discordance
persisted until the Court’s unanimous decision in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999]
SCJ No. 16, [1999] 1 SCR 497 which essentially confirmed and elaborated on the original Andrews test.
8
In 1999 Law v. Canada, supra note 7 introduced consideration of whether “human dignity” was violated; that
concept was explicitly rejected nine years later in R. v. Kapp, [2008] SCJ No. 42, 2008 SCC 41. In 2004, Hodge v.
Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] SCJ No. 60, 2004 SCC 65 introduced “mirror
comparators”; that concept was explicitly rejected seven years later in Withler v. Canada (Attorney General),
[2011] SJC No. 12, 2011 SCC 12. In 2008, R. v. Kapp rejected the “human dignity” test, but introduced a
discrimination test focused narrowly on “stereotype and prejudice”; that test was explicitly rejected seven years
later in Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, [2013] SCJ No. 5, 2013 SCC 5.
9
R v. Kapp, supra note 8 introduced a framework by which “if the government relies on s. 15(2) to defend the
distinction” identified in the first step of the s. 15(1) test , “the analysis proceeds immediately to whether the
distinction is saved by s. 15(2)”: Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v. Cunningham, 2011 SCJ
No. 35, 2011 SCC 35 at para. 43-44. Ten years later, Alliance, supra note 1 at para.39 rejected the notion that s.
15(2) is a stand-alone defence to s. 15(1) claims.
10
Alliance was decided by a 6-3 majority. In CSQ the Court ruled 5-4 that s. 15 was violated, but the s. 15 majority
split 4-1 in ruling the violation was justified under s. 1. Ultimately, eight judges upheld the law as constitutional.
11
Pay Equity Act, being Division 14 of Budget Implementation Act 2018 No. 2, S.C. 2018 S.C. 27 (“Federal PEA”)

5

legal principles that the SCC had just enunciated and which replicated provisions
previously struck down as unconstitutional.12 Meanwhile, in pay equity litigation, the
Ontario Attorney General argued that reliance on the two SCC pay equity rulings was
“misplaced and unhelpful” even though they addressed substantially the same legal
issues that were at stake in Ontario.13 The federal statute’s failure to reflect current legal
principles, and the extreme formalism of Ontario’s radically narrow approach to
constitutional precedent, both signal an abiding resistance to equality in practice. They
raise serious grounds to question whether, in a period of intensifying political
polarization, the federal and provincial governments have stopped engaging in the
“Charter dialogue” when it comes to equality rights.14 While Alliance marks one step
forward in equality jurisprudence, these subsequent government actions may mark two
steps backwards for women’s equality rights in practice.
Part II of this paper provides an orientation to the socio-economic context of the
gender pay gap, the elements of that gap which are targeted by pay equity, and the
evolution of the right to equal pay for work of equal value that is enshrined in pay equity
laws.
Part III provides an overview of Alliance and CSQ. The cases, respectively,
address women’s right to an enduring remedy for systemic sex discrimination and
women’s access to pay equity remedies in female-dominated workplaces.
Part IV grapples with the enduring fault lines in the jurisprudence. In examining
the four foundational questions about formal vs substantive equality, systemic
discrimination, the role of section 15(2), and an equality lens on section 1, the paper
confronts the discomfort that chafes beneath the Court’s declaration that, while

12

Alliance, supra note 1; Syndicat de la fonction publique du Québec inc. c. Québec (Procureur général), 2004 CanLII
76338 (QCCS)
13
Factum of the Intervener, The Attorney General of Ontario in Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Participating
Nursing Homes; Service Employees International Union Local 1 v. Participating Nursing Homes, Ontario Superior
Court of Justice (Divisional Court), Court File Nos. 362/16, 364/16, 444/16 and 445/16 at para. 68 and 95-98 (on file
with the author).
14
Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the
Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing after All)” (1997) 35:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 75
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cherished, equality is “perhaps the Charter’s most conceptually difficult provision”.15 Part
IV uses Alliance and CSQ to speak to the silences in the jurisprudence – the obdurate
refusal to speak about power – that prevent a consistent analysis of how systemic
discrimination operates.
Part V examines the fragility of section 15’s protection in the face of political
resistance to the principle of substantive equality. It uses the federal Pay Equity Act and
Ontario’s litigation techniques to reflect on this tension and its implications for section
15’s future.

II – CONTEXT: THE GENDER PAY GAP IN CANADA16
Systemic sex discrimination that suppresses women’s pay has long been
documented and condemned in Canada. As early as 1984, Rosalie Abella J.’s landmark
Equality in Employment Royal Commission Report stated that the fact systemic sex
discrimination lowers women’s pay is “one of the few facts not in dispute in the ‘equality’

15

Law v. Canada, supra note 7 at para. 2
While this paper follows the structure of pay equity legislation which speaks of discrimination between “female” and “male-” dominated jobs, the author recognizes that gender is fluid and not confined to a rigid binary of
female/male. Human rights statutes in every Canadian jurisdiction protect against discrimination based on gender
identity and gender expression: see, for example, Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 3(1); Ontario
Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19, sections 1 through 7; cf Saskatchewan Human Rights Act, 2018, S.S.
2018, c. S-24.2, s. 2(1) which lists gender identity as a prohibited ground of discrimination but not gender
expression. Research is beginning to document workplace discrimination – including pay discrimination – based on
gender identity and gender expression: We’ve Got Work to Do: Workplace Discrimination and Employment
Challenges for Trans People in Ontario, 2:1 Trans Pulse E-Bulletin (May 30, 2011); Ishani Nath, “For transgender
women the pay gap is even wider”, Macleans (February 8, 2018) online at: https://www.macleans.ca/society/fortransgender-women-the-pay-equity-gap-is-even-wider/ (accessed July 28, 2019). To date, however, pay equity
analysis struggles to break out of the female/male binary because the sex discrimination that results in unequal
pay has been driven by practices which, over centuries, have institutionalized the devaluation and marginalization
of work done by those who identify as women based on norms and prescribed gender roles anchored in a
female/male binary. Similarly, the statistical and socio-economic data which establish an evidence-based
correlation between female-dominance of occupations and suppressed pay reflects that binary. Parallel in-depth
and long-term research documenting similar correlations between occupations and suppressed pay on other
grounds – including race, Indigeneity, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression – has
not yet been conducted, owing in large part to a lack of data that disaggregates statistics on these grounds. A
critique of the limits of this analysis is beyond the scope of this paper but warrants further examination.
16
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debate”.17 Yet, despite laws that have prohibited sex discrimination in pay for
generations, a large and measurable systemic gender pay gap continues to impoverish
women relative to men across the country and across the labour market.
Various metrics are used to measure the gender pay gap between women’s and
men’s earnings. The size of the gap differs whether it is measured by hourly pay, fulltime/full-year pay or annual earnings; but on all measures women are paid significantly
less than men.18
Annual earnings provide the most realistic picture of how much less money
women have than men to meet their needs. The gender pay gap annual earnings
measure also captures the many ways that systemic sex discrimination resonates in
women’s pay, including as a result of: (a) prejudicial treatment in hiring, training and
promotions; (b) sex-based occupational segregation; (c) devaluation of women’s skills
and labour in traditional “female” occupations; (d) women’s overrepresentation in parttime, casual, seasonal and temporary help agency work; (e) women’s
overrepresentation in minimum wage work; (f) gender-based violence that drives
women from jobs and/or occupations; (g) barriers to unionization which arise because
generations-old labour legislation was designed around male full-time work patterns;
and (h) women’s disproportionate burden in performing unpaid care work.19
Canada’s 2016 Census data20 on women’s and men’s annual earnings reveal
that on average, women across Canada earn 32% less than men. This gap is larger for
women with disabilities (56%), immigrant women (55%), Indigenous women (45%) and
racialized women (40%). The precise wage gap varies by province,21 but the existence
of the gender pay gap, and its pattern of exacerbation through intersecting forms of

17

Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella, Equality in Employment: A Royal Commission Report (Canada: 1984) (“Abella
Report”) at 232
18
See for example, Ontario, Final Report and Recommendations of the Gender Wage Gap Steering Committee,
prepared for the Minister of Labour and Minister for Women’s Issues (2016) (“Gender Wage Gap Report”) at 17-18
19
Ontario Equal Pay Coalition, Fact Sheet #1: Facts and Figures about the Gender Pay Gap (2019)
20
These are the most current comprehensive statistics at the time of writing.
21
Alberta has the largest gender pay gap at 41%: see Kathleen Lahey, Equal Worth: Designing Effective Pay Equity
Laws for Alberta (Parkland Institute, 2016) at 3.
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discrimination persists across all provinces.22 In 2019, Canada has the seventh largest
gender pay gap out of the 35 countries in the OECD and the second largest gender pay
gap in the G7.23
The gender pay gap is pervasive. As economist Kate McInturff revealed, “women
are paid less than men in almost every occupational category measured by Statistics
Canada (469 of 500 occupations if you want to be precise).”24 Women are paid less at
every age group in the workforce. The gap is lowest at ages 15-24 (18%); peaks at
ages 25-34 (39.6%); then remains between 33% and 38% throughout the rest of
women’s working lives. A lifetime of suppressed wages leads to a 34% gender gap in
women’s pensions.25 Women receive a lower return on their educational investment
than men as women are paid less than men at every level of educational attainment
from high school (27%), through apprenticeship and trades (39.6%), to undergraduate
education (35%).26 Women are paid less than men at every income decile, except for
the lowest 10% of earners where women receive $190 more per year than men.27
This gender pay gap persists despite multiple legal commitments to women’s
right to discrimination-free pay. As observed by Abella J. in her Royal Commision

22

Canada, Census (2016), Annual Earnings. See Sheila Block and Grace-Edward Galabuzi, Persistent Inequality:
Canada’s Colour-coded Labour Market (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (December 2018) on the
intersection of race and sex in suppressing wages. Their analysis reveals an earnings hierarchy in which nonracialized men are the highest earners followed in descending order by racialized men, non-racialized women and
finally racialized women.
23
OECD (2019), Gender wage gap (indicator). doi: 10.1787/7cee77aa-en (Accessed on 28 July 2019). The OECD
measures the gender pay gap using the median annual earnings of women and men who work full-time.
24
Kate McInturff, Women’s Work: What is it Worth to You? (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives: 1 January
2016).
25
Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Closing the Gender Pay Gap: Background Paper (October 2015) at 22-23. See also:
Girl Guides of Canada, Girls on the Job: Realities in Canada (2019) which partnered with Ipsos on a survey which
revealed that girls in high school earn on average $3 less per hour than boys and were streamed into traditionally
female care work. See also Statistics Canada, Income of individuals by age group, sex and income source, Canada,
provinces and selected census metropolitan areas, Table 11-10-0239-01 (formerly CANSIM 206-0052); and
Statistics Canada, The Economic Well-Being of Women (2018), Catalogue 89-503-X, Tables 3a and 3b.
26
Ontario, Closing the Gender Pay Gap, supra note 25 at 22
27
Mary Cornish, Every Step You Take: Ontario’s Gender Pay Gap Ladder (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives,
2016). Moving through the income ladder, women faced the following gender pay gaps at the respective deciles:
the lowest 20% of earners 15%; in the lowest 30% of earners: 27%; mid-range deciles: 25%; top 10% of earners:
37% gap. Meanwhile, a study of women who are CEOs and top executives of Canadian corporations face a 32% pay
gap relative to their male colleagues: David Macdonald, Double-Paned Glass Ceiling: The Gender Pay Gap at the
top of Corporate Canada (Canadian Centre of Policy Alternatives, January 2019)
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report: “the [pay] gap persists through good times and bad times. It persists in the face
of society’s commitment to justice. It persists in defiance of the law.” 28
Canada’s legal obligations to eliminate sex-based pay discrimination exist at both
the international and domestic level. In 1919, the International Labour Organization
recognized women’s right to equal pay for work of equal value in its founding
Constitution.29 As a member of the ILO, Canada is bound by this Constitution. The ILO’s
1951 Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100) which elaborated on this right was
ratified by Canada in 1972.30 Canada has ratified successive international human rights
instruments – including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women31 and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action32 – with
increasingly prescriptive directions exhorting governments to take positive action,
including legislative action, to achieve equal pay for work of equal value. In 1998, the
ILO declared women’s right to equal pay for work of equal value one of its eight
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.33
These international human rights commitments34 have influenced Canada’s
legislative action toward increasingly proactive obligations to close the gender pay gap35

28

Abella Report, supra note 17 at 232
International Labour Organization, Constitution (Preamble)
30
Adoption: Geneva 34th ILC Session (29 June 1951); entry into force 23 May 1953; ratified by Canada 16
November 1972
31
18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981; accession by Canada 10
December1981) at article 11 (“CEDAW”)
32
United Nations, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China (1995) chap. 2, resolution 1,
annex 1 (Beijing Declaration) and annex II (Beijing Platform for Action) Strategic Objectives F.1, para. 165(a), F.2,
para. 166(l), F.5, para. 178(a), (k), (l).
33
International Labour Organization, (General Conference, 86th Sess., Geneva, June 1998)
34
Canada has ratified numerous international instruments committing it equal pay for work of equal value. But the
most recent UN Periodic Reviews of Canada’s compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and CEDAW each expressly highlight the
reviewing committee’s concerns about the persistent gender pay gap across Canada and its exacerbated impact on
Indigenous women, racialized women and low income women; the persistence of horizontal and vertical sex
segregation of occupations; and a lack of affordable childcare that perpetuates sex segregation of occupations, the
gender pay gap and women’s continuing primary role in unpaid care work :UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Canada, 23 March 2016, E/C.12/CAN/CO/6
at 5, para.21; UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Canada, 11
August 2016, CCPC/C/CAN/CO/6 at 2, para.C7; UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, Concluding observations on the combined eighth and ninth periodic reports of Canada, 25 November
2016, CEDAW/C/CAN/CO/8-9 at 14, para. 38(a) and (b)
29

10

using the legal standard of “equal pay for work of equal value”. “Pay equity” is the term
of art which refers to this specific legal standard.
In 1951, the same year ILO Convention No. 100 was adopted, Ontario introduced
the Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act – Canada’s first statute to protect
women’s right to equal pay without discrimination based on sex. Between 1952 and
1975, the federal government and remaining provinces followed suit. These “first wave”
equal pay guarantees –now incorporated into employment standards legislation –
protect women’s right to be paid the same as men doing substantially the same work.
The “second wave” of protections came as provincial and federal human rights
statutes were adopted between 1962 and 1979. 36 Human rights laws give broad
guarantees of equality in all aspects of employment from advertising for jobs, through
recruitment, hiring, training, pay, benefits, promotions, harassment on the job,
terminations, and discriminatory impacts of any other terms and conditions of work.
These two statutory frameworks had limited impact on closing the gender pay
gap, however, because they require individual women to file complaints about their
circumstances. Combatting systemic wage discrimination that permeates the labour
market cannot be done effectively one woman, one case at a time. Thus, in 1986, five
years after Canada acceded to CEDAW, provinces began introducing pay equity
statutes which mandated employers to proactively deliver equal pay for work of equal
value.37
Women in Canada remain “concentrated in industries that parallel their traditional
gender roles at more than double the rate of men”; within industries, “women and men
tend to occupy distinct occupations, with women’s typically being at lower levels than

35

See the history outlined in Alliance, supra note 1 at para. 6-11.
Territorial human rights codes were introduced later: Yukon (1987), North-West Territories (2002), Nunavut
(2003).
37
Manitoba introduced Canada’s first proactive pay equity legislation in 1986. In 1987, Ontario introduced the first
proactive pay equity legislation that applied to both the public and private sector and in 1992 expanded the law to
become the first pay equity statute that provided remedies for women who work in predominantly female
workplaces in the broader public sector. In 1996, Quebec introduced the first statute that provided pay equity
entitlements to women in female-dominated workplaces in both the public and private sector.
36
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men’s”; and across industries women continue to work in occupations that parallel
traditional gender roles of care work, education and service.38 The proportion of women
working in the twenty most female-dominated occupations in Canada has barely shifted
in more than a generation, from 59.2% in 1987 to 56.1% in 2015.39 Pay equity laws
address the fact that sex segregation by occupation and workplace is accompanied by
systemic devaluation of the work women do. As the Ontario Pay Equity Hearings
Tribunal summarized in one of Canada’s foundational pay equity rulings:
Women are paid less because they are in women’s jobs, and women’s jobs are
paid less because they are done by women. The reason is that women’s work –
in fact, virtually anything done by women – is characterized as less valuable. In
addition, the characteristics attributed to women are those our society values
less. In the workplace, the reward (wage) is based on the characteristics the
worker is perceived as bringing to the task. … The lower the value of those
characteristics, the lower the associated wage.40
Since 1987 the SCC has recognized that discrimination arises from the continued
operation of systems that have been designed around the interests, values and
experiences of groups with greater political, economic and social power and privilege.
Whether it is intentional or not, this systemic discrimination is frequently a product of
continuing to do things ‘the way they have always been done’.41
Pay equity laws identify how these unspoken assumptions and practices operate
and eliminate their discriminatory effects. They address the impact of the sex
segregation of work by comparing the wages of women and men doing different jobs of
similar value. Pay equity laws impose proactive obligations on employers that generally
track these five steps:

38

Melissa Moyser, Women and Paid Work (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, corrected version published March 9, 2017)
at 22-24.
39
Moyser, Women and Paid Work, supra note 38 at 23-24 and Table 7.
40
Ontario Nurses’ Association v Women’s College Hospital (1992), 3 P.E.R. 61 (ONT PEHT) at para. 16-18. See also
Haldimand-Norfolk (No. 3) (1990), 1 P.E.R. 17 para 44; aff’d (1990), 1 P.E.R. 188 (Ont. Div. Ct.) and Marie-Therese
Chicha, L'equite salariale: mise en oeuvre et enjeux, 3è ed.,( Cowansville: Editions Yvon Blais, 2011) at 23.
41
See CN v Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] SCJ No. 42 at para 34, [1987] 1 SCR 1114 at 11381139: “systemic discrimination in an employment context is discrimination that results from the simple operation
of established procedures … none of which is necessarily designed to promote discrimination.” See also: British
Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, [1999] SCJ No. 46, [1999] 3 SCR 3 at para. 68
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Step 1:

Identify which jobs are female-dominated, male-dominated or
neutral in that they do not reflect a gender predominance in present
or historical incumbency or norms.

Step 2:

Evaluate female-dominated and male-dominated jobs based on
their skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions to determine,
in a gender-neutral way, the value of all jobs to the employer.

Step 3:

Compare the total compensation of female- and male-dominated
jobs of similar value.

Step 4:

Adjust the total compensation of female-dominated jobs to close
the pay gap where they are paid less than male-dominated jobs of
similar value.

Step 5:

Monitor compensation on an ongoing basis to ensure that as new
jobs are created, old jobs disappear and duties of existing jobs
change of over time, discriminatory devaluation of women’s work is
not revived. Where pay equity gaps re-emerge, employers must
maintain pay equity by adjusting the pay of female-dominated jobs
on an ongoing basis to close the pay equity gaps as they arise.42

In unionized workplaces, pay equity statutes typically require that this process be
conducted with active participation of the bargaining agent. In non-unionized
workplaces, employers conduct the analysis to create a pay equity plan but workers
must be given a period to review and challenge the employer’s analysis.
Pay equity laws epitomize the active intervention that the SCC has recognized is
necessary to “break a continuing cycle of systemic discrimination”; “to create a climate
in which both negative practices and negative attitudes can be challenged”; and to
“destroy those patterns in order to prevent the same type of discrimination in the future.”

42
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They are consistent with Canada’s bedrock human rights principle that systemic
discrimination requires systemic remedies.43

III – THE QUEBEC PAY EQUITY APPEALS
Both 2018 pay equity appeals arose from challenges to Quebec’s PEA.44
1.

CSQ: Pay Equity in Female-Dominated Workplaces
The legal challenge in CSQ was brought by unionized women – primarily

childcare workers and language interpreters – working in traditionally female-dominated
occupations in deeply sex segregated industries. Their workplaces had no maledominated jobs. They argued that by imposing a multi-year delay and denial of a
remedy for sex-based wage discrimination in female-dominated workplaces, the PEA
violated their right to equality contrary to section 15.
The PEA was passed in 1996. Section 1 expressed the laws purpose as being to
“redress differences in compensation due to the systemic gender discrimination suffered
by persons who occupy positions in predominantly female job classes.” Further, it stated
that women working in female-dominated workplaces without male-dominated jobs have
the right to pay equity using wage comparisons from outside their specific enterprise.
The law required employers, generally, to pay out any identified pay equity
adjustments beginning in 2001.45 But for women working in Quebec’s over 2,000
female-dominated private sector workplaces,46 the PEA delayed their pay equity
remedies for 11 years. Regulations directing how to select male comparators from
outside sex segregated workplaces were not made for nine years.47 Section 38 of the
PEA granted a further two-year grace period for employers to implement the
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comparisons.48 For these women, section 38 and section 129 of the PEA rendered pay
equity a right without a remedy until 2007 and they received no remedy for
discrimination that existed before 2007. During this entire eleven-year period from 1996
to 2007, women in female-dominated workplaces had no other legal recourse for sex
discrimination in pay because the PEA prohibited them from seeking remedies under
the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms.49
The Quebec Superior Court dismissed the section 15 Charter claim. While
acknowledging that the PEA imposed a disadvantage on women, the Court found that
“the reason [for the disadvantage] is not that women occupy these positions but rather
than the enterprises that hire them have no predominantly male job classes to ensure
comparison”.50 Accordingly, the distinction was not based on sex but on “working in an
enterprise where there are no predominantly male job classes”; this did not qualify as an
analogous ground.51 Without citing section 15(2) of the Charter, the Court held that
government had no obligation to address pay equity. Rather than delaying access to
pay equity, section 38 should be read as establishing the timetable to enable women to
access pay equity remedies.52
The Quebec Court of Appeal issued a one-sentence ruling: “Nous partageons
entièrement l'avis du juge de première instance.”53
The Supreme Court of Canada split 5-4 on the section 15 analysis. Five judges54
ruled that section 38 of the PEA violates section 15 of the Charter by discriminating on
the basis of sex; but four found this justifiable under section 1. Four judges found no
48

PEA, s. 38.
Under s. 128 and s. 129 of the PEA, jurisdiction for any sex-based pay discrimination complaints filed after
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section 15 violation because they held the differential treatment was based on “the lack
of male comparators in their employers’ enterprises,” not sex.55 Only McLachlin CJC
found a section 15 violation that could not be justified under section 1.56
2.

Alliance: Employers’ Duty to Maintain Pay Equity
Alliance addresses employers’ duty to maintain pay equity after it is first

established. The original 1996 PEA required employers to maintain pay equity by
adjusting compensation an ongoing basis as pay discrimination re-emerged over time.
Despite statutory deadlines for compliance, by 2006 only 47% of employers had pay
equity plans and a further 38% had not even begun the pay equity process. The Court
writes: “[f]aced with this widespread non-compliance, Quebec decided to reduce the
employers’ obligation to maintain pay equity, in the hope that doing so would lead to
better compliance.”57 In 2009, amendments replaced employers’ continuous pay equity
maintenance obligation with pay equity audits to be conducted every five years.58
Where an audit disclosed a discriminatory pay gap, absent proof of employer bad faith,
the remedy only adjusted women’s pay on a go-forward basis.59 Unlike pay equity plans
which are negotiated with the union, the pay equity audits were conducted by the
employer alone. The employer was required to post the audit results but was not
required to disclose the information and analysis upon which those results were
based.60
The pay equity audit and maintenance provisions affect all Quebec workers who
are subject to the PEA. Several unions jointly challenged these provisions,61 arguing
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that by allowing remedies only every five years and only on a go-forward basis, the PEA
created periods during which identified discrimination was not rectified. Further, by
excluding unions from the pay equity audits and denying access to the information and
analysis on which the audit results were based, the PEA denied the ability to determine
if the audits were valid.
The Quebec Superior Court and Quebec Court of Appeal both agreed that by
prohibiting remedies for pay discrimination that emerged during the five years between
audits and by prohibiting access to the audit information, the PEA violated section 15
and that violation was not justifiable under section 1.62 Both Quebec courts ruled that
the PEA did not discriminate based on sex by allowing employers to conduct pay equity
audits without union involvement.63 The Attorney General of Quebec appealed the
decisions. The Unions cross-appealed the ruling on unions’ exclusion from pay equity
audits.
The SCC ruled 6-3 in favour of the claimants on the lack of remedy between
audits and the denial of audit information.64 They ruled, however, that the unions “have
not …discharged their onus of proving that the lack of employee participation has a
discriminatory impact in the circumstances of this case.”65 The dissenting judges held
that there was no violation of section 15 and even if there was, “the Act as a whole
should be protected under s. 15(2)”.66
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IV – ONE STEP FORWARD: RECOGNIZING SYSTEMIC
DISCRIMINATION
1.

Confronting Privilege
Throughout its section 15 jurisprudence, the SCC has waxed rhapsodic over the

idea of equality, proclaiming that section 15 “reflect[s] the fondest dreams, the highest
hopes and the finest aspirations of Canadian society”.67 At the same time, though, the
Court is less comfortable with equality as a reality, protesting that “the difficulty lies in
giving real effect to equality”.68 This sentiment was echoed in Binnie J.’s declaration in
Newfoundland v. NAPE that “pay equity has been one of the most difficult and
controversial workplace issues of our times.”69 In both Alliance and CSQ, Côté J. firmly
roots her dissenting reasons within the “difficulty” frame, bemoaning the “almost
inherent difficulty” in interpreting section 15 and reiterating Binnie J.’s complaint that pay
equity is difficult.70 Yet, these conclusory declarations of equality’s purported difficulty
are offered without explanation of – and ward off scrutiny of—what precisely about
equality makes it so difficult to understand and implement. The protestations moreover
ring hollow when the SCC routinely deals with legally complex, high stakes appeals in
criminal, tax, transnational corporate law, amongst others, without complaining that they
are too difficult. So what is it about equality that makes the Court squeamish?
Equality litigation is “difficult” – or more accurately gives rise to feelings of
discomfort – precisely because it confronts how law operates as the tool that
institutionalizes power and privilege in society.71 In judicial reasoning, the presumption
of a law’s constitutionality at times is conflated with an assumption of compliance with
constitutional norms in practice. This erases the reality and dynamics of systemic
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discrimination and replaces them with the narrative that discrimination is aberrant rather
than endemic:72
Charter litigation … is premised on the notion that the baseline experience
is one of constitutional compliance that delivers security and rights
protection. The unspoken assumption is that an individual starts with an
experience of rights protection and the impugned state action is an
aberrant divergence from that presumed status of [constitutional]
security.73
From the outset, Charter equality jurisprudence has stressed that discrimination
is primarily systemic. Yet, most Charter litigation has challenged isolated provisions in a
single statute which may deny access to a specific benefit. These cases are
overwhelmingly formal equality claims involving direct discrimination.74 This repetition
reinforces formal equality as the paradigmatic case, creating the impression that
discrimination is narrow and isolated and that only minor adjustments are required to
achieve equality. Only rare Charter claims have challenged the structural roots of
systemic discrimination and those have met with mixed success.75 To paraphrase
Jonnette Watson Hamilton and Jennifer Koshan, while accepting substantive equality in
principle, the Court struggles to shed formal equality as the paradigmatic case which in
turn impairs the Court’s ability to grapple with systemic discrimination.76
In examining the categorical declarations that equality and pay equity are
“difficult”, then, it is important to disaggregate what is in fact jurisprudentially complex,
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and what is better characterized as conceptual dissonance or avoidance techniques
that arise in legal reasoning.
2.

Advancing a Substantive Equality Analysis of Systemic Discrimination
Justice Abella’s majority reasons in Alliance and CSQ demonstrate that a

rigorous substantive equality analysis that addresses the impact of systemic
discrimination is possible. Her reasons mark an advance in substantive equality
analysis and the role of section 15(2) of the Charter. They also make inroads in bringing
a gendered lens to section 1 analysis that may open the way to activate section 28 of
the Charter in constitutional analysis.
(a)

Systemic Discrimination77
Systemic discrimination refers to how power structures relationships between

groups in society, privileging some and marginalizing others.78 Within this power
dynamic, dominant groups attach socially constructed meaning to human traits – such
as sex – and have entrenched social systems and behaviours that institutionalize those
traits as a basis on which to unequally distribute social, economic and political rights,
material well-being, social inclusiveness and social participation.79 As the SCC has
observed, systemic discrimination institutionalizes practices that, through
the imbalances of power, or the discourses of dominance, such as racism,
ablebodyism and sexism, … result in a society being designed well for
some and not for others. It allows those who consider themselves ‘normal’
to continue to construct institutions and relations in their image …80
Systemic discrimination claims target the impact of practices and systems that
have been established and normalized over time within this unequal power
relationship.81 They “necessarily involve an examination of the interrelationships
77
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between actions (or inaction), attitudes and established organizational structures”.
Claims “alleging gender-based systemic discrimination cannot be understood or
assessed through a compartmentalized view”; instead they must be “understood,
considered, analyzed and decided in a complete, sophisticated and comprehensive
way.”82
Justice Abella’s majority reasons undertake just such a comprehensive view.
They accept that systemic sex discrimination is real and identify how it operates to
create and sustain a gender pay gap which disadvantages women. They also
steadfastly maintain a systemic frame when analyzing the impact of the impugned
statutory provisions.
The majority reasons in both appeals accept that in reality there is a “deep and
persistent gap between women’s and men’s pay”83 and that women have been and
continue to be underpaid due to systemic discrimination which devalues women’s work
socially and economically.84 Justice Abella succinctly captures the essence of systemic
sex discrimination which deprives “women of benefits routinely enjoyed by men –
namely, compensation tied to the value of their work. Men receive this compensation as
a matter of course” while women must repeatedly “clear the specific hurdle of proving
that they should be paid equally not merely because they are equal, but because their
employer acted improperly.”85
Significantly, understanding how sex discrimination operates systemically leads
the majority to recognize that discrimination in pay “exists in the workforce whether or
not there are male comparators in a particular workplace” and that “women in
workplaces without male comparators may suffer more acutely from the effects of pay
inequity precisely because of the absence of men in their workplaces.”86 In this way the
majority integrates a full understanding of how a deeply sex segregated labour market
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and sex segregated workplaces in which female-dominated work is most devalued are
the end products of the systemic devaluation of women’s work.
As a result, the majority in CSQ easily identified that denying a pay equity
remedy to women in female-dominated workplaces was based on sex. Access to a
remedy was “expressly defined by the presence or absence of men in the workplace”
and women in female-dominated workplaces are “the group of women whose pay has,
arguably, been most markedly impacted by their gender”. 87 In the PEA, women’s close
proximity to male work determines whether they are entitled to a remedy for systemic
sex discrimination. The more women have suffered from systemic sex discrimination
that results in deeply sex-segregated occupations, sex-segregated workplaces, and
undervaluing of women’s work, the less they are entitled to remedies for systemic sex
discrimination.
Similarly, understanding the dynamics of systemic discrimination enabled the
majority in Alliance to recognize that systemic pay discrimination is not simply historical
but operates on a continuing basis.88 This lead the majority to recognize that the pay
audit process that provided remedies only on a go-forward basis was discriminatory
because it effectively granted an amnesty from equality compliance of up to five years.
As the Court noted, “this has the effect of making the employer’s pay equity obligation
an episodic, partial obligation.”89 But “the Charter right to equality is not episodic right
that exists only at designated intervals but slumbers without effect between times”.90 It
must be protected in a continuous, enduring way and remedies for its breach must be
similarly seamless. Finally, in understanding systemic discrimination as an ongoing
pattern of behavior, Abella J. recognized that denying access to the information
underpinning pay equity audits was discriminatory because it undermines any air of
reality to the promise of equality. Access to that information was a necessary
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operational precondition to verifying the audit and exercising any right to challenge its
results.
The majority reasons, then, mark an advance because the reality of systemic
discrimination is not merely observed once in passing but the systemic lens remains at
the forefront, shaping the entire section 15 analysis.
(b)

Section 15(2)
Section 15(2) of the Charter has bedeviled equality rights jurisprudence since the

SCC’s 2008 ruling in R. v. Kapp91. Before this, the jurisprudence treated section 15(2)
as an interpretive aid that supported the substantive equality interpretation of section
15(1)92. Section 15(2) “reinforce[d] the important insight” that in a social reality of
systemic discrimination “substantive equality requires positive action to ameliorate the
conditions of socially disadvantaged groups”.93
Kapp instead gave section 15(2) independent effect as a “defence” to allegations
of discrimination: “if the government can demonstrate that an impugned program meets
the criteria of s. 15(2), it may be unnecessary to conduct a s. 15(1) analysis at all.”94
Kapp provided shelter from full section 15 scrutiny if a government could demonstrate
that the impugned law, program or activity has an ameliorative or remedial purpose and
targets a disadvantaged group identified by enumerated or analogous grounds. Unlike
the focus on effects that informs the rest of Canada’s equality jurisprudence,95 under
section 15(2) the Court adopted an analysis focused exclusively on the government’s
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intent such that the Court would ask if it was “rational for the state to conclude that the
means chosen to reach its ameliorative goal would contribute to that purpose”.96
Kapp and the Court’s 2011 decision in Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development) v. Cunningham97 both interpreted section 15(2) in appeals where parties
who were not beneficiaries of an affirmative action program challenged it as being
discriminatory. Had the approach, in implementation, been constrained to
circumstances involving claims of ‘reverse discrimination’ by privileged groups, this may
not have been problematic. But, instead, in the wake of Kapp, section 15(2) has been
raised routinely in litigation to respond to equality rights challenges.
When used outside the context of reverse discrimination, Kapp undermined the
integrity of the division between section 15 and section 1 of the Charter. It dragged the
analysis of purpose and rational connection out of section 1 into section 15. As will be
seen in addressing Côté J.’s dissenting reasons, this heightened the stakes on the first
step of the section 15(1) test in identifying whether a “distinction” exists that needs to be
addressed under section 15.
Moreover, by allowing government to use section 15(2) to prevent claims by
beneficiaries of affirmative ameliorative programs, it prevented those supposed
beneficiaries from challenging any discriminatory impact under those programs. As
identified by Kasari Governder and Tess Sheldon, by eliminating any analysis of the
effect of government action, this approach effectively displaced section 15 as a rights
framework and reduced it to a charitable framework in which disadvantaged groups
must accept government’s good intentions as the complete scope of constitutional
protection.98 Apart from being a paternalistic approach to the Charter which erodes
substantive rights protection, that approach directly contradicted the well-established
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section 15 principle that good intentions cannot save a law that has discriminatory
effects.99
The majority reasons in both pay equity appeals effectively pushed back at this
development. The 2018 rulings reinforced a commitment to substantive equality by
restoring section 15(2) to its original role as an interpretive aid to section 15(1). The
majority held that in the appeals at issue “s. 15(2) has no application whatever”. 100 This
step back to an earlier legal position marks a step forward in understanding how power
dynamics operate in relationships marked by systemic discrimination. The majority
underscored that the purpose of section 15(2) is to “save ameliorative programs from
the charge of ‘reverse discrimination’”.101 In doing so, the majority aligns section 15(2)
with the Court’s longstanding dictum that
In interpreting and applying the Charter … the courts must be cautious to
ensure that it does not simply become an instrument of better situated
individuals to roll back legislation which has as its object the improvement
of the condition of less advantaged persons.102
The majority made clear that section 15(2) is not a “stand alone defence” for
government “to any and all claims brought under s. 15(1)”;103 it is a “defence” for those
who are the beneficiaries of a special program that ameliorates systemic discrimination.
Accordingly, section 15(2) can only operate in response to “a claim from someone
outside the scope of intended beneficiaries who alleges that ameliorating those
beneficiaries discriminates against him”.104
This important recalibration should protect substantive equality by restoring the
relationship between section 15 and section 1 of the Charter and by keeping section 15
focused in a unified way on addressing systemic discrimination. The routine use of
section 15(2) in equality litigation reinforced a legal and public discourse in which all
equality claims are viewed as suspect while at the same time preventing analysis of
99
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actual systemic impacts. At a practical level, reliance on section 15(2) should cease
except when invalidating ‘reverse discrimination’ claims.
(c)

Bringing a Gender Lens to Section 1
Finally, Abella J.’s reasons in Alliance take small steps towards incorporating a

gendered lens into assessing what is considered demonstrably justifiable in a free and
democratic society. This is necessary to meet the Charter’s commitment in section 28
that “the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female
persons.” Section 28 is significantly understudied105 and has to date played a limited
role in litigation.106 But if section 1 analysis does not consider the gendered implications
of justifying a breach of Charter rights – including a breach of Charter rights other than
section 15 – it risks reintroducing and rehabilitating the discriminatory norms and
practices that were found to violate equality rights under section 15. Without a gender
lens, systemic sex discrimination will inform what is otherwise framed as “gender
neutral” deference to government, what is considered “rational”, what is characterized
as “minimal impairment” and what is accepted as a “proportionate” balance between
deleterious and beneficial impacts. As Kerri Froc writes in her landmark thesis,
activating section 28 would keep systemic discrimination’s impact at the forefront
throughout the whole Charter analysis:
Viewing the Charter through a “gender equality lens” requires courts, …
to shift their conceptualization of gender as exclusively a matter of
inherent identity possessed by human beings upon which neutral legal
rules apply, to gender as a structure or as a relation. It means considering
how constitutional doctrine is gendered, that is, examining how “gender
acts upon [constitutional] law: how it functions in the context of conferring
105
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[constitutional] meanings; how it informs the content, organization and
apprehension of [constitutional and] legal knowledge; and how it serves to
legitimate [constitutional] law and reinforce particular…outcomes,”
particularly as it “consistently appears not to do so.”107
The impact of bringing a gender lens to or omitting it from section 1 analysis is
well illustrated by contrasting Alliance with Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE108
the last pay equity dispute that was heard by the SCC under the Charter.
Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE examined provincial legislation that
eliminated three years’ worth of pay equity adjustments that were owed to public sector
employees. The SCC found that eliminating the pay equity debt violated section 15, but
then derailed vindication of their equality rights by reintroducing discriminatory norms
under section 1. The section 1 ruling was based on judicial notice and what the Court
acknowledged was a “casually introduced” record whose weakness would normally be
of “serious concern”.109 Despite this, the Court accepted the government’s assessment
that a financial crisis justified eliminating the pay equity payments. The Court used
disparaging language in equating a decision to pay the equality debt to “throw[ing]”
other claims and priorities to the winds”.110 It cast doubt on whether meeting Charter
equality obligations “must necessarily rank ahead of hospital beds or school rooms”
without appreciating the irony that the women staffing the hospitals at issue were the
very ones bringing the Charter claim.111 Ultimately, the Court ruled that the effect on the
women, while “deeply unfortunate” was “purely financial” and that it would merely “leave
the women hospital workers with their traditionally lower wage scales for a further three
years.”112
By contrast, in Alliance Abella J. definitively ruled that leaving discriminatory pay
in place after it has been identified perpetuates systemic sex discrimination.113 To
normalize these practices is not purely financial but ideological in that it “makes women
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‘the economy’s ordained shock absorbers’”.114 It also feeds rather than breaks the cycle
of systemic discrimination because it
[r]einforces one of the key drivers of pay inequity: the power imbalance
between employers and female workers. By tolerating employer decisionmaking that results in unfair pay for women, the legislature sends a
message condoning that very power imbalance, further perpetuating
disadvantage.115
As Abella J. wrote in her 1984 Royal Commission report:
The cost of the wage gap to women is staggering. And the sacrifice is not
in aid of any demonstrably justifiable social goal. To argue, as some have,
that we cannot afford the cost of equal pay to women is to imply that
women somehow have a duty to be paid less until other financial priorities
are accommodated. This reasoning is specious and it is based on an
unacceptable premise that the acceptance of arbitrary distinctions based
on gender is a legitimate basis for imposing negative consequences …116
While she didn’t make specific reference to section 28 of the Charter, Abella J.
effectively considered whether the government’s proposed justifications for the breach
perpetuated systemic discrimination. She found that they did. The government argued
that it reduced employers’ pay equity maintenance obligations because it sought to
encourage increased employer compliance with the law in a context where less than
half of employers have complied with their obligations. Abella J. voiced reservations
about the government’s alleged purpose and whether its chosen method was rationally
connected to that purpose, then concluded that “the justification starts to melt away at
the minimal impairment stage”, particularly as “[l]owering the bar in the hopes of
compliance strikes me, in any event, as being inconsistent with respect for substantive
equality.”117 In applying a clear gender lens, she concluded as follows on the final stage
of the section 1 test:
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The speculative suggestion that sacrificing that right [to pay equity] in the
hope of encouraging the possibility of better compliance, does not
outweigh the harm caused by the limitation.
Reducing employers’ obligations in the hopes of encouraging compliance
subordinates the substantive constitutional entitlement of women to be
free from discrimination in compensation to the willingness of employers to
comply with the law. It sends the policy message to employers that
defiance of their legal obligations under the Act will be rewarded with a
watering-down of those obligations. And it sends the message to female
workers that it is they who must bear the financial burdens of employer
reluctance. Any benefits of that approach are outweighed by its harmful
impact on the very people whom this pay equity scheme was designed to
help. 118
This gendered lens brings an integrity and consistency to the principles that
inform the Charter analysis. This case takes a meaningful step forward in bringing a
renewed critical perspective to section 1 and it lays the groundwork to explicitly
incorporate and build on the full implications of section 28 for Charter jurisprudence.
3.

Resistance to Substantive Equality: Re-fighting Old Battles
Even while Abella J.’s majority rulings made strides on substantive equality

analysis, Côté J.’s dissenting reasons resuscitate arguments and techniques of
reasoning that have been repeatedly rejected by the SCC. In this respect, the persistent
instability at the root of equality jurisprudence does not reflect uncertainty or complexity
in the law so much as a resistance to equality’s operation as a means of redistributing
power and rights. The dissenting reasons yield many more examples of these
avoidance techniques, but four will suffice.
First, rather than following the uncontestable principle that Charter claims must
be analyzed from the perspective of the claimant, the dissenting reasons proceed from
the perspective of the government respondent. The dissent in Alliance begins by
chastising the majority for holding the Quebec government to account under the Charter
at all because
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Quebec has been a pioneer in the struggle against pay inequities in
private sector enterprises in Canada … From this perspective, it is
profoundly unfair to Quebec society to claim that these amendments are
unconstitutional.119
Then rather than examining the PEA’s impact on the claimants, the dissent decries the
possibility that liability could be imposed on the government based on the inflated
premise that the PEA would “almost inevitably” be found disadvantageous if it fails to
close the pay equity gap “perfectly”.120 In CSQ, the dissent begins with 24 paragraphs
outlining the government’s efforts and challenges in developing the PEA and its
associated regulation. This again anchors the analysis firmly in the government’s
perspective and compounds the error by drawing into the section 15 analysis a full
consideration of the government’s justifications which properly belong only under
section 1.
Second, despite giving lip service to the principle of substantive equality, the
dissent actually employs a rigid formal equality analysis that takes place squarely within
the four corners of the impugned Act.121 This approach has been roundly rejected since
1989 on the basis that it would lead to a “mechanical and sterile” analysis that is
disconnected from an understanding of the claimants’ location “in the entire social,
political and legal fabric of our society”.122 In CSQ, this is precisely what arose in the
dissent. Côté J. noted that the disadvantageously affected group “consists mostly of
women” but one could not, on that basis, conclude that the discrimination was based on
sex: “to resolve this issue, we must go further and ask what the basis for this differential
treatment is.” In going further, the dissent held that the differential treatment arises not
because of sex, but because of “the lack of male comparators in their employers’
enterprises”.123 There is no explanation for why the dissent’s analysis stops here. The
dissent does not at this point “go further” to ask the key question: why is there a lack of
male comparators? Had they done so, it would have led them to the dynamics of
119

Alliance, supra note 1 at para. 64 (per Côté J. in dissent) (emphasis added)
Alliance, supra note 1 at para. 84 (per Côté J. in dissent) (italics in the original)
121
In addition to the dynamic outlined in this paragraph, the dissent in CSQ also resurrected the mirror comparator
analysis that was rejected in
122
R. v. Turpin, [1989] SCJ No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 at para. 46
123
CSQ, supra note 4 at para. 121-122(per Côté J. in dissent)
120

30

systemic sex discrimination, which produce the sex segregated labour market that
devalues women’s work – clearly a discriminatory dynamic based on sex.
Third, the dissents disavow any potential government accountability for the
discriminatory impacts experienced by the claimants on the basis that the government
did not create the economic disadvantage; it pre-existed the PEA. The dissent takes the
position that the government could only be found in violation of the Charter if its own
actions made that pre-existing discrimination worse. This stance contradicts the
longstanding principle that a claimant’s pre-existing disadvantage and the dynamics of
systemic discrimination which produced that disadvantage are a core part of the
contextual analysis under section 15.124 More insidiously the dissent’s approach treats
existing systemic discrimination as an acceptable – or natural – baseline that is immune
from Charter scrutiny. Far from eradicating existing discrimination, the dissent’s
approach condones and preserves it.
Fourth, the dissent takes the position that the choice to adopt the pay equity audit
process in the PEA was a political decision that is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.
The dissent states categorically that this choice “belongs to the elected representatives
of Quebecers and not to this Court.”125 The dissent raises the oft-heard and oft-rejected
argument that if legislation intended to help disadvantaged groups was subject to
Charter scrutiny it would discourage governments from addressing disadvantage. Abella
J. in Alliance addresses the absurdity of the dissent’s assertions as follows:
There is no evidence to support the in terrorem view advanced by my
colleagues that finding a breach would have a “chilling effect” on
legislatures. That amounts to an argument that requiring legislatures to
comply with Charter standards would have such an effect. Speculative
concerns about the potential for inducing statutory timidity on the part of
legislatures has never, to date, been an accepted analytic tool for deciding
whether the Constitution has been breached. Legislatures understand that
they are bound by the Charter and that the public expects them to comply
with it. The courts are facilitators in that enterprise, not bystanders.126
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No new ground is broken by the Court in rehearsing these battles. Each sortie
essayed by the dissent and deflected by the majority has been attempted and rejected
in the past. But in continuing to resist the principles and logic of substantive equality, the
dissent’s positioning seems to suggest that equality rights can somehow be achieved
without any redistribution of rights, benefits and material well-being. This is impossible.
Meanwhile, the routine repetition of these oft-rejected arguments means that those who
seek to claim section 15’s protection must, with each new case, stand ready to defend
the exact gains that have been won multiple times in the past.

V – TWO STEPS BACKWARD: WHITHER (WITHER) CHARTER
DIALOGUE?
While the majority position at the SCC makes meaningful progress in advancing
principles of substantive equality, governments seem unfazed by the Court’s
jurisprudential direction. As a result, women’s historic Charter victory in Alliance is
already under threat. Instead of a Charter dialogue, it appears that the phone is off the
hook.
First, in introducing a new proactive Pay Equity Act,127 the federal government
appears not to be engaging in the expected Charter dialogue with the Courts.128 The
federal PEA was introduced as part of the 884-page Budget Implementation Act, 2018
No. 2.
Like the Quebec PEA, the federal PEA adopts a five-year pay equity audit cycle
for maintaining pay equity. Section 88(4) appears to provide that pay adjustments
identified in the audit take effect on a go forward basis. Similar to Quebec, the federal
PEA amends the otherwise-applicable Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA) to prohibit
women from filing pay discrimination complaints under it.129 Despite the fact it was
introduced five months after Alliance was released, the federal PEA appears to replicate
the precise effects that the SCC just ruled unconstitutional. Moreover, the federal PEA
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enables some employers to decide that job evaluations that pre-date the new PEA are
compliant with the new law.130 This lies in tension with Alliance’s holding that denying
workers the information on which to evaluate and challenge employer-developed pay
equity violates the Charter. Moreover, comparable provisions in Quebec’s PEA which
preserved “relativity plans” that predated that province’s law were found to violate
section 15 of the Charter and were ruled unconstitutional in 2004.131 In these respects,
there is a clear breakdown of – or disregard for – communication on what is required for
Charter compliance.
The federal PEA contains other red flags that, while not previously ruled
unconstitutional, raise meaningful concerns about prejudicial impacts on equality rights.
The new Act’s purpose clause makes the objective of achieving pay equity subject to
“the diverse needs of employers”. Contrary to Abella J.’s section 1 reasons in Alliance,
this subordinates fundamental equality rights to employer-defined “needs” and also
undercuts the existing broad right to equality in the CHRA. Canada’s PEA contains
sweeping powers by which Cabinet can make regulations to exempt “any employer,
employee or position, or any class of employers, employees or positions, from the
application of any provision of this Act” with or without conditions.132 Other provisions in
the Act actually reduce the scope of rights protection below what currently exists in the
CHRA.133 This contradicts the basic equality rights principle that legislative action to
address equality must move the bar forward, not back.134
These concerns are sufficiently serious that the Standing Senate Committee on
National Finance took the unusual step of passing BIA No. 2 but appending
observations specifically, and only, on the new PEA. Those observations state:
“Considering the concerns expressed by a certain number of witnesses, your committee
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calls for the Government of Canada to initiate a parliamentary review in six years’ time
at the latest” and suggested eight specific areas of concern to be examined.135
Secondly, on the provincial front, the Attorney General for Ontario has adopted a
litigation strategy that takes an aggressively narrow approach to the precedential value
of the new SCC judgments and a formalist analysis that effectively ignores the SCC’s
systemic analysis.
Unionized nursing and service employees at 143 female-dominated nursing
homes across Ontario sought to enforce pay equity maintenance using the external
male comparators they originally used to achieve pay equity. Without access to the
external comparators, they argued, workers in female-dominated workplace were
denied equal benefit and protection of the maintenance provisions in the Ontario Pay
Equity Act,136 and denied a full remedy for discrimination, in violation of section 15 of the
Charter. In essence, the Ontario case combines the two issues addressed in the SCC
pay equity appeals: Were women in female-dominated workplaces denied the same pay
equity maintenance rights granted to other women under the PEA? If so, does that
violate section 15 of the Charter by discriminating on the basis of sex? In 2016, the Pay
Equity Hearings Tribunal denied the Unions’ applications for reasons that mirror those
of the Quebec Superior Court in CSQ. The Tribunal found that while there was
differential treatment under the PEA, the distinction did not discriminate because it was
based on women’s “locus of employment” in a female-dominated workplace, not
“sex”.137
On judicial review, the government argued that reliance on CSQ was “misplaced
and unhelpful” because the specific mechanics by which external comparators were
identified for female-dominated workplaces differed in the provincial statutes and
because the impugned effects arose from different distinguishing techniques (in Quebec
135
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through delay, in Ontario through denial of access to male comparators).138 Meanwhile,
the substantive legal question in both cases was identical: whether differential treatment
of workers in female-dominated workplaces discriminates contrary to section 15 of the
Charter.
Similarly, even though both Alliance and Participating Nursing Homes addressed
the denial of women’s rights to pay equity maintenance, Ontario argued that Alliance
was distinguishable because the statutory mechanisms by which maintenance operated
differed under the two provincial statutes.139 Meanwhile, the substantive legal question
to which Alliance spoke was identical: whether denial of full remedies in the context of
pay equity maintenance violated section 15 of the Charter.
Finally, in the alternative, Ontario argued that any distinction under the Ontario
PEA “is protected by section 15(2)” because the overall purpose of the PEA is to
redress systemic gender discrimination.140 This argument tracks Côté J.’s dissents
rather than Abella J.’s clear majority holding that section 15(2) is only available to
dispute ‘reverse discrimination’ claims which were not at issue.
Ultimately these legislative and litigation initiatives represent two steps
backwards in women’s fight for substantive equality. Charter litigation is lengthy,
resource intensive and expensive. The victory in Alliance was hard won and the
majority’s analysis robust. It should provide strong guidance for systemic discrimination
claims going forward. But under the current political arrangements, governments’
disregard of the SCC’s jurisprudential direction and rigid formalism in argument actively
undermines women’s right to substantive equality and poses a serious threat to
women’s access to justice. As long as this governmental resistance persists, it will
encourage and fuel judicial recalcitrance to abandon the familiar and repeatedly
rejected legal arguments reflected in the SCC dissents. Until then, we’ll be walking in
circles.
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